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Threats as Criminal Assault
Ranelle A. Gamble*
T HE MORES, GROUP SANCTIONS and religious ethics of a society attempt
to regulate interactions between humans as harmoniously as pos-
sible. But it sometimes requires the intervention of formal legal au-
thority to maintain a semblance of peace in the community by punish-
ing disapproved conduct. All too frequently, social interaction leads to
conduct that is tortious or criminal. Early in its history, the common
law found it imperative to acknowledge and define an individual's in-
terest in his personal integrity, physical safety and mental tranquility.
The law formulated the legal rules of assault to protect this particular
interest when it is wrongfully interfered with by another.' In this
latter half of a nerve-wracking twentieth century, it is becoming nec-
essary to revive the early concepts of common law assault, and under
certain circumstances, 2 to redress abusive and insulting language.
Any principle of common law, particularly one concerned with the
control of human behavior, has social implications, and such principle,
whether dealing with a tort or a crime, must advance or retreat ac-
cording to the social need.3 Outrageous behavior, encompassing overt
antisocial acts and abusive language, is once again being recognized by
the authorities to be a legal as well as a social problem.
Assault as a Tort and a Crime
Assault can be a tort, a crime, or both simultaneously if the de-
fendant's act falls within the scope of liability for both. Manslaughter,
as a form of homicide, is, of course, punished as a crime. Manslaughter
is the result, or harm, of an act defined by statute or common law
as criminal, or as otherwise unlawful. The following questions then
arise: Can manslaughter be the result of a mere tort?; Is the death of
the victim limited to the legal liability for wrongful death, essentially
* B.A., New York University; Second-year student at Cleveland State University
College of Law.
1 See Prosser, Law of Torts, § 3, "Social Engineering" (3d ed. 1964).
2 Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 63, 101
(1950): "A rule to this effect would merely be restating a condition which existed in
the days of the very beginning of the common law, when certain vituperative names
were treated in the same way as assaults and when the law of defamation sought to
redress insults as well as to protect reputation. It may seem retrogressive, a return
to more barbaric times, to restore the rules of the middle ages. Instead, it has been
called a mark of a more advanced civilization that tort liability affords protection
against abusive language."
3 Reckless, The Crime Problem, C. 2 at 19 (3d. ed. 1961). "It is the scheme of social
values current in any society that dictates the importance or unimportance or the
sacredness or profanity of any activity in society .... The social values assigned to
different kinds of behavior vary in time and place, and this is true of behavior that
becomes defined as criminal in our criminal laws."
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a tortious effect?; Does conduct defined as tortious come within criminal
liability as unlawful? The answers are vital since imprisonment is
the punishment for manslaughter, and only monetary damages are
the compensation awarded for wrongful death in tort.
If the defendant's act has been defined by statute or common law as
criminal, and the direct and proximate harm resulting from such act
has also been described in criminal law with a proper sanction against
the wrongdoer, then the consideration whether or not the same act
can also be redressed in tort does not ameliorate the criminal nature
of the act, or avoid the criminal liability.4
There has not yet been a successful codification of the law of torts
as there has been for criminal law, and the definitions are not always
clear-cut. Nonetheless, torts are defined as acts which invade or inter-
fere with another's rights created or recognized by law.5 Such tortious
acts are, therefore, unlawful, in violation of interests protected by law,
and may create criminal liability if the injury resulting is defined in
the criminal statute.
The Restatement of Torts describes tortious conduct as acts which
are
. . . intended to cause an invasion of an interest legally protected
against intentional invasion, or conduct which is negligent as cre-
ating an unreasonable risk of invasion of such a interest, but also
conduct which is carried on at the risk that the actor shall be sub-
ject to liability for harm caused thereby, although no such harm
is intended . . 6
Criminal conduct is defined by statute or by the principles of com-
mon law.7 Both types of wrongful conduct are concerned with the
field of intentional invasions of rights; the legal difference is that tortious
conduct violates private law and the civil rights of an individual, and
criminal conduct violates the public law as declared by statute, and in-
fringes upon the public rights.8
The crucial distinction between tortious and criminal conduct is
the difference in the effects, the "substantive harms." 9 A text on crim-
inal law defines harm:
Harm, then, is the violation of the intangible, legally protected in-
terest (sometimes interests) which, in those crimes calling for a
4 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, § 7.
5 Id. at § 1.
6 Restatement of Torts 2d (1965), § 6.
7 Reckless, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 17: "Any act which by omission or commission runs
counter to the criminal law could be defined as a crime or criminal behavior in the
legal sense."
8 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Bk. III, 2; Bk. IV, 5. (Baker,
Voorhis & Co. ed., N.Y.C., 1938.)
9 Ibid.
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physically ascertainable effect of conduct . . . is identical with such
a physical effect . ..
The Restatement contrasts the terms "harm" and "injury" in con-
templation of tort:
...harm implies the existence of loss or detriment in fact, which
may not necessarily be the invasion of a legally protected interest.
The most usual form of injury is the infliction of some harm, but
there may be an injury although no harm is done .. "I
Blackstone distinguished the effects of tort and crime: "Crimes ...
strike at the very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist when
actions of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity . . . ," whereas,
civil injuries are "immaterial to the public.' 12
The same facts of a situation may constitute both a tort and a crime,
but such facts must be carefully analyzed from the two distinct view-
points of tort law and criminal law. Injury to the individual is the con-
cern of tort law in viewing the disapproved conduct, but social harm
has no monetary value in the view of criminal conduct. 14
Underlying the definitions of both tortious and criminal conduct
is the social morality upon which the tort injury and the criminal harm
is based. 15 Professor Hall states:
The relevant ethical standards postulate the autonomy of the in-
dividual and his "right" to be made whole. So too, the above
postulates, re-enforced by moral attitudes, give a designated "so-
cial harm," which, though nonmeasurable in money, are as "real"
as is the damage to a particular individual. Thus the damage re-
quirement in tort law serves to select and limit the "facts" to those
that constitute harm to particular persons. It follows that moral
culpability is of secondary importance in tort law. But in penal
law . . . the immorality of the actor's conduct is essential whereas
pecuniary damage is irrelevant. 16
In the recent Ohio case of State v. Nosis, 17 a criminal conviction for
manslaughter in the first degree was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
which held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a judgment by
the court that the defendant assaulted the deceased, which assault di-
1o Hall & Mueller, Criminal Law and Procedure, C. 3, p. 90. (2d ed. 1965).
11 Restatement of Torts, § 7.
12 Blackstone, op. cit. supra n. 4, at Bk. IV, 5.
14 Hall, Interrelation of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 Col. L. Rev. 753, 976 (1943).
15 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, Sec. 4 at 16: "In a very vague general way, the law of
torts reflects current ideas of morality, and when such ideas have changed, the law
has kept pace with them." And at 17: "It is now more or less generally recognized
that the 'fault' upon which liability may rest is social fault, which may but does not
necessarily coincide with personal immorality."
16 Hall, op. cit. supra n. 12, at 971.
17 22 Ohio App. 2d 16, 257 N.E. 2d 414 (1969).
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rectly and proximately resulted in the victim's fatal heart attack. De-
fendant's acts consisted of a technical assault, menacing conduct and
verbal abuse.
In the spring of 1968, decedent, while driving in his automobile and
accompanied by his wife, attempted to pass the defendant in his auto-
mobile on a moderate grade, and blew his horn several times to warn
the other of his intention to pass. At the next red light, the defendant
jumped out of his car, ran up to the decedent's car, and pulled open
the door, stating a desire to fight with the driver. At this point, the
decedent's wife leaned over the steering wheel and warned the de-
fendant that her husband had a bad heart. Nonetheless, the defendant
continued to follow the couple for several miles, and then into their
driveway at home. Defendant got out again and began cursing the
decedent who, himself, then warned the defendant that he had a bad
heart. It was to no avail, as the defendant continued his verbal abuse,
whereupon the victim suffered a heart attack and died in the driveway.
Two statutes were invoked for criminal prosecution: the "man-
slaughter statute"1 8 which states that the unlawful killing of another
is manslaughter in the first degree; and the "assault and battery stat-
ute"' 9 which reads:
No person shall assault or threaten another in a menacing manner,
or strike or wound another.
Was the technical assault (defendant's pulling open the door of
decedent's car),20 sufficient to bring him within the criminal assault
statute, and thereby, impose liability under the manslaughter statute
for the victim's death?
Determining Criminal Liability
Criminal liability for assault refers to an unlawful attempt, with
present ability, to commit a violent injury upon the person of another. 2 '
It is also said (in Ohio, for example) to include a threatening of another
in a menacing manner without necessarily touching his person.22 In
the criminal assault statute, the word "menacing," used to describe the
defendant's manner, means the manifestation of an intention to inflict
injury.23 Ohio's criminal statutes are based on the common law, and a
18 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2901.06.
19 Id., § 2901.25.
20 United States v. Anderson, 190 F. Supp. 589 (D. Md. 1961); see also Crossman v.
Thurlow, 336 Mass. 252, 143 N.E. 2d 814 (1957); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Hammer, 177 F. 2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949).
21 People v. Stagg, 29 Ill. 2d 415, 194 N.E. 2d 342 (1963).
22 State v. Thiesen, 94 Ohio App. 461, 115 N.E. 2d 863 (1962).
23 State v. Moherman, 62 Ohio App. 258, 15 Ohio Ops. 185, 555, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 223,
23 N.E. 2d 651 (1939).
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good definition of assault has been suggested by Turner in his article,
"Assault at Common Law":
It is an assault at common law when any person intentionally, or
recklessly, by active conduct threatens to apply unlawful physical
force to the person of another in such a manner as to create in the
mind of that other an apprehension that such force is about to be so
applied.2 4
At what point does common law assault become criminal under
the statute? That crucial point is reached when the actor's intention,
"mens rea," is to inflict personal injury upon his victim.2 5 Defendant,
according to the testimony of the Nosis case, did not display a weapon.
But could criminal intent be inferred from his reckless disregard of
the warnings of decedent's heart condition? The court held that it
could be reasonably foreseen by an ordinarily prudent person that the
victim could have a heart attack as a result of defendant's conduct, and
that the defendant had been twice warned of the decedent's heart con-
dition. It was said by the court in People v. Carlson, "There must exist
in the mind of the accused, at the time of the act or omission, a con-
sciousness of the probable consequences of the act, and a wanton dis-
regard of them." 26
It must be shown that a homicide was not improbable under the
facts as they existed which should reasonably have influenced the
conduct of accused . . . (I)t is ordinarily required that the negli-
gence on which involuntary manslaughter may be based must
be of a gross or flagrant character, such as would show wantonness
or recklessness, or would evince a reckless disregard of human life,
or the safety of others, or indifference to consequences, equivalent
to criminal intent.2 7
Therefore, "mens rea," or guilty intent, is present when the wrong-
doer has the intention to produce the harmful effect, or has knowledge
that the harm will come from the act (scienter). Scienter can be equiv-
alent to criminal intent, according to the circumstances.2 8 In his article.,
Turner says,
In common assault the "mens rea" is merely the realization in the
mind of the wrongdoer that his conduct will produce the necessary
24 Turner, Assault at Common Law, 7 Camb. L. J. 56, 67 (1939).
25 Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463, 56 Am. Rep. 42 (1885).
26 176 Misc. 230, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 1003, 1005 (1941).
27 40 C.J.S. Homicide, Sec. 62 at 925-926 (1944). See Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186
Va. 839, 44 S.E. 2d 409, 412 (1947): "The negligence required in a criminal proceeding
. . . is a recklessness or indifference incompatible with a proper regard for human
life. It must be shown that a homicide was not improbable under all the facts exist-
ing at the time, and that the knowledge of such facts should have had an influence
on the conduct of the offender."
28 Hall & Mueller, op. cit. supra n. 10.
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impression in the mind of the victim. He must, in other words,
either intend to alarm the victim, or (it is submitted) intend to do
something which he realizes may cause such alarm. 29
Another viewpoint of "mens rea" is given by Mueller in his article,
"The Public Law of Wrongs-Its Concepts in the World of Reality":
Precisely speaking, guilt is not merely objective attribution, but,
rather, is a societal finding of a frame of mind, or an attitude, with
which the perpetrator created the criminal harm . . . Guilt, or
mens rea, then, is the known or felt ethico-legal negative value of
the deed-a community value known to the perpetrator at the time
of the deed. To this must be added the perpetrator's wish and de-
cision to act nevertheless. 30
An applicable maxim here might be, in criminal acts, that the in-
tention is to be regarded and not the results (in maleficiis voluntas
spectatur non exitus). There was a warranted inference of criminal
intent, from the view of common law and sociology, in the Nosis case,
and the court was justified in holding that the menacing and threatening
behavior of the defendant towards his susceptible victim, by words and
acts, constituted a criminal assault.
Having determined that defendant's conduct violated the assault
statute, the court then correctly held, on the basis of expert medical
testimony, that the death of the victim proximately resulted from the
criminal assault, and was, therefore, manslaughter.
Under Ohio's criminal code, first degree manslaughter is the unlaw-
ful killing of another, without malice, and either voluntary, upon a
sudden quarrel, or unintentional, while the slayer is in the commission
of some unlawful act.3 1 The Ohio manslaughter statute does not require
an express intent to kill, but recklessness can be substituted as an
equivalent.3 2 Black v. State said:
Unlawful killing as used in manslaughter must be such as would
naturally, logically and proximately result from the commission
of some unlawful act as defined by statute, and such unlawful act
must be one that would be reasonably anticipated by an ordinarily
prudent person as likely to result in such killing.33
29 Turner, op. cit. supra n. 24, at 63.
30 Mueller, The Public Law of Wrongs-Its Concepts on the World of Reality. 10 J.
Pub. L. 203, 237 (1962).
31 State v. McDaniel, 103 Ohio App. 163, 3 Ohio Ops. 2d 235, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 522, 144
NE. 2d 683 (1956), dism. 166 Ohio St. 378, 2 Ohio Ops. 268, 142 N.E. 2d 654 (1957).
32 Contra, Smith v. State, 40 Ala. 158, 109 S. 2d 853 (1959): "In order to constitute
manslaughter in the first degree, there must be either a positive intent to kill, or an
act of violence from which, ordinarily, in the usual course of events, death or great
bodily harm may be a consequence.... Without an intent to kill there can be no
murder, or manslaughter, in the first degree."
33 103 Ohio St. 434, 133 N.E. 795 (1921).
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Using this test for manslaughter, the Appeals Court affirmed the
Nosis conviction for first degree manslaughter.33a
Is the defendant Nosis liable also in tort for his conduct? If the
victim had survived his heart attack, would he have a cause of action
for civil assault?
Determining Civil Liability
Civil assault consists of acts that amount to an offer to use force,34
accompanied by an apparent present ability to immediately carry out
the threat of inflicting bodily harm.35 The general rule still prevailing
excludes mere words, no matter how insulting, vituperative, violent,
profane, obscene, threatening or abusive.30 Liability is incurred for
civil assault when the actor intends to cause a battery to another, or
intends to bring about an imminent apprehension of such a battery,
and the victim is actually put in such apprehension. 37 The requisite
intention is present when the act is done for the purpose of causing such
apprehension,3s or with knowledge that to a substantial certainty, such
apprehension will result.39 It is the intent of the wrongdoer that usually
is the crux of the assault, both tortious and criminal, and liability is
created with its formation.40 It means a desire to produce the harmful
effect, or knowledge that such an effect will occur.41 Following are two
authors' explanations of intent:
"Intent" is the word commonly used to describe the desire to bring
about the physical consequences up to and including death; . . .42
It must extend not only to those consequences which are desired,
but also to those which the actor believes are substantially certain
to follow from what he does. 43
33a State v. Nosis, supra n. 17.
34 State v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 671, 48 S.E. 544 (1904); Haupt v. Swenson, 125 Iowa 694,
101 N.W. 520 (1905); Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich. 157, 192 N.W. 652 (1923).
35 Osburn v. Veitch, 1 F. & F. 317, 175 Eng. Rep. 744 (1858); State v. Church, 63 N.C.
15 (1868); contra, Woodruff v. Woodruff, 22 Ga. 237 (1857); also see Seavey, Threats
Inducing Emotional Reactions, 39 N.C. L. Rev. 74 (1968).
36 Gelhaus v. Eastern Air Lines, 194 F. 2d 774 (5th Cir. 1952); Johnson v. General
Motors Acc. Corp., 228 F. 2d 104 (5th Cir. 1955); Stavnezer v. Sage-Allen & Co., 146
Conn. 460, 152 A. 2d 312 (1959); Gefter v. Rosenthat, 384 Pa. 123, 119 A. 2d 250 (1956);
Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E. 2d 735 (1948); Ashford v. Board of Liquor
Control of State, 121 N.E. 2d 164 (Ohio Com. P1. 1962); Ryan v. Conover, 59 Ohio App.
361, 18 N.E. 2d 277 (1938), where it was held that verbal abuse is regarded as
"slander."
37 Restatement of Torts, § 21, § 32.
38 Id., Comments (d) and (f).
39 Id., at Comment (d).
40 Id., Comment (f); see also, Raefeldt v. Koenig, 152 Wis. 459, 140 N.W. 56 (1912).
41 Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463, 56 Am. Rep. 42 (1885); State v. Deso, 110 Vt. 1, 1 A.
2d 710 (1938).
42 Cook, Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 Yale L. J. 644 (1917).
43 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, § 8 at 31 and 32.
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Nonetheless, mere knowledge and appreciation of risk which is
not a substantial certainty is not the equivalent of intent.44 "Quasi in-
tent" 45 can be formed by reckless conduct that is intentionally done,
unreasonable in character, done in spite of a known risk, and when it
is highly probable that harm will result.46 If the defendant proceeded
in his acts in a conscious disregard of, or indifference to, the conse-
quences, then such "quasi intent" can be inferred,47 and will impose
liability in Ohio.4s Such liability has been incurred by defendants
who did continue their highly unreasonable conduct despite a high de-
gree of danger, either known to them or apparent to a reasonable man
in their position, 49 even without the required "quasi" or inferred intent.
The key to assault is the element of apprehension. 0 The defendant
is liable even if his intention was limited to making his victim fearful
of injury. Liability will not be avoided even if the victim knew of this
limitation, but despite such realization was put in apprehension because
of the assailant's menacing and threatening manner.
The other may realize that the actor intends only to frighten him,
but even so, he may believe that there is a chance that the act
will go beyond its intended purpose and cause a harmful or of-
fensive contact. If so, both the required intention and the required
apprehension are present and the actor is liable.51
Threats by words do not constitute an assault unless they are
combined with acts or circumstances that put the victim in reasonable
apprehension of an imminent, harmful contact.5 2 The general rule is
qualified, however, in that words which accompany or precede acts
seen and understood by the victim, may be concrete evidence of the
actor's intention to commit the assault, and of the other's apprehen-
sion.53 It is clear therefore, that a challenge to fight can be held to be
44 Ibid.
45 Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91, 143 (1932).
46 Cope v. Davison, 30 Cal. 2d 193, 180 P. 2d 873, 171 A.L.R. 667 (1947); Sullivan v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 155 So. 2d 432 (La. App. 1963).
47 Helleren v. Dixon, 152 Ohio St. 40, 86 N.E. 2d 777 (1949); Universal Concrete Pipe
Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843, 119 A.L.R. 646 (1936).
48 Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N.E. 2d 122 (1948).
49 Taylor v. Lawrence, 229 Or. 259, 366 P. 2d 735 (1961); Cramer v. Dye, 328 Mich.
370, 43 N.W. 2d 892 (1950); Turner v. McCready, 190 Or. 28, 222 P. 2d 1010 (1950);
see also Restatement of Torts, § 500, Comment (c). Contra Cope v. Davison, op. cit.
supra n. 46, which held that the intent to do harm is required.
50 Restatement of Torts, § 21, Comment (c): "In order that the actor shall be liable
... it is only necessary that his act should cause an apprehension of an immediate
contact whether harmful or merely offensive." See also Erickson, What Constitutes
an Assault?, 16 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 14 (1967).
51 Restatement of Torts, § 28.
52 Id., § 31.
53 Ibid.
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an assault. In the Nosis case, the pulling open of the car door, accom-
panied by such a challenge, clearly constituted an assault.
Another facet of the defendant Nosis' liability was the outrageous-
ness of his conduct towards the decedent, which directly resulted in
severe emotional distress and the physical injury, ultimately ending in
death. Liability imposed for such extreme conduct is an extension of
the principles of the tort of assault.54 The rule is postulated in Section
46 of the Restatement of Torts:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reck-
lessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.54a
A landmark case, State Rubbish Collection Ass'n v. Siliznoif, stated,
in the words of Justice Traynor, that,
* . . a cause of action is established when it is shown that one, in
the absence of any privilege, intentionally subjects another to the
mental suffering incident to serious threats to his physical well-
being, whether or not the threats are made under such circumstances
as to constitute a technical assault.55
In the earlier Ohio case of Bartow v. Smith,56 the majority opinion
did not follow the modern rule, but the two dissenting justices strongly
advocated the principles of the Siliznoif case and the Restatement.57
The intentional infliction of mental disturbance by extreme and
outrageous conduct is a relatively "new tort," and has been much ad-
vocated and discussed by the legal writers in the past forty years. s
Prosser dubbed the tort "orneriness," and likened it to assault. It would
54 Id., § 46, Comment (f); see also § 31, Comment (a).
54a Id., § 46.
55 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P. 2d 282 (1952).
56 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E. 2d 735, 743 (1948). The majority opinion held that, "It
is axiomatic that opprobrious epithets, even if malicious and profane and in public,
are ordinarily not actionable. There is no right to recover for bad manners!"
57 Id., at 746 (Dissent by Justice Zimmerman): "There is an abundance of respect-
able authority supporting the proposition that where one wilfully and with a mali-
cious motive uses vile and opprobrious language toward another, under conditions
where deleterious consequences might reasonably be anticipated and the use of such
language does in fact cause an emotional disturbance resulting in physical harm, the
actor may be made to respond in damages for the consequences of his inexcusable
and reprehensible contact." See notes 46 and 49, supra.
58 Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497 (1922);
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev.
1033 (1936); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich.
L. Rev. 874 (1939); Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 Vand.
L. Rev. 63 (1950); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 40 (1956); Vold, Tort
Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 18 Neb. L. B. 222 (1939);
Borda, One's Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquility, 28 Geo. L. J. 55 (1939);
Seitz, Insults, Practical Jokes, Threats of Future Harm, 28 Ky. L. J. 411 (1940);
Smith, An Independent Tort Action For Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress,
7 Drake L. Rev. 53 (1957); Seavey, Threats Inducing Emotional Reactions, 39 N.C.
L. Rev. 74 (1968); 52 Cal. L. Rev. 939 (1952); 25 So. Cal. L. Rev. 440 (1952).
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include ". . . the intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering
in an extreme form." 59 Wade called the tort "insult," as derived from
the original Latin term for assault, "insultum." 60  The Restatement
describes the conduct as:
The prohibited conduct is conduct which in the eyes of decent men
and women in a civilized community is considered outrageous and
intolerable. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the
facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim "Outra-
geous!" 61
The gist of the outrage is the defendant's knowledge of the vulner-
ability of the victim.6 2 Such was the fact in the Nosis case. It was
outrageous to add insult to injury by subjecting the victim to verbal
abuse after inexcusably following him home. It was the opinion of the
court that the emotional disturbance that brought on the victim's heart
attack was a result foreseeable by all parties, and recognized in law
as an effect and harm entitled to compensatory damages and criminal
sanction.6 3 The defendant would be liable even for "unexpectable"
bodily harm caused by the severe emotional distress brought on by his
assault.6 4 Intention, once again, is the basis of the liability, and exists
when the purpose of the act is to bring about the emotional distress, or
is done with the knowledge and awareness that such distress is sub-
stantially certain to result:
If an act is done with the requisite intention it is immaterial that
the actor is not inspired by any personal hostility to the other ...
Such conduct is tortious. The injury suffered by the one whose
interest it invades is frequently far more serious to him than cer-
tain tortious invasions of the interest in bodily integrity and other
legally protected interests .. 65
Mental disturbance and emotional suffering, in the form of the
apprehension of physical injury, is the important element of assault,
and especially in its concept as a "new tort." The invasion of the vic-
tim's mental peace is an assault, as an individual is protected against
a "purely mental disturbance of his personal integrity." 66
59 Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev.
874 (1939).
60 Wade, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 110.
61 Restatement of Torts (1948 Supp.), § 46. Comment (g).
62 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 40 (1956).
63 For medical documentation of emotional disturbance, see Tibbetts, Neurosthenia,
the Result of Nervous Shock as a Ground for Damages, 59 Cent. L. J. 83 (1904);
Earengy, The Legal Consequences of Shock, 2 Medico-Legal Crim. Rev. 14 (1934);
Burdick, Tort Liability for Mental Disturbance and Nervous Shock, 5 Cal. L. Rev.
177 at 186 (1905).
64 Restatement of Torts, op. cit. supra n. 61.
65 Ibid.
66 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, § 11, Infliction of Mental Distress, at 37.
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Conclusion
Bartow v. Smith, decided 22 years ago, is still the tort rule in Ohio.
The true test for liability should be the intention of the wrongdoer, par-
ticularly in the light of his knowledge of the probable effects of his
behavior on the other.
The Ohio criminal statute for assault and battery recognizes that
a threat or a menace alone, without any overt act, can constitute an
assault. In this writer's opinion tort liability should be extended to
cover the same area as the criminal statute covers. In 1971, the civil
courts of Ohio should review their conservative position as taken in
the Bartow case, and modify the rule for recovery for verbal abuse
and emotional disturbance and distress according to the principles of the
''new tort."
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